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Since the late 1990s, a number of Islam-
ic movement specialists have begun to
bridge the gap between the study of
Islamic activism and social science the-
ories of collective action. The underly-
ing premise is that Islamic activism is
not sui generis. Rather than emphasiz-
ing the specificity of Islam as a system
of meaning, identity, and basis of col-
lective action1, these scholars point to
movement commonalities rooted in
process: how contention is organized,
the way ideas are framed and propa-
gated, how grievances are collec-
tivized, and tactics and strategies in
response to exogenous shifts in op-
portunities and constraints. By focus-
ing on shared mechanisms of con-
tention rather than the uniqueness of Islam, such an understanding
avails itself of a broader array of concepts, theories, and comparative
empirics. In this new approach, scholars primarily emphasize three
sets of processes—resource mobilization, decision making, and fram-
ing—each of which is operative in both Islamic and non-Islamic ac-
tivism.
Resource mobilization
Many studies of Islamic activism emphasize the underlying griev-
ances that engender impetus for collective action, including blocked
social mobility, a lack of political freedom, economic despair, a sense of
cultural vulnerability, and humiliation. The central argument is that, as
Ted Gurr once famously put it, “misery breeds revolt.” 
The problem with such arguments is that while misery is ubiquitous,
mobilization is not. Social movement theorists have attacked griev-
ance-based explanations as incomplete: grievances are not irrelevant,
but there is a missing intermediary set of variables that is necessary to
translate grievances into actualized mobilization. In particular, move-
ments need resources and mobilizing structures to collectivize what
would otherwise remain individualized grievances. Money, communi-
cations technology, meeting places, social networks, and other re-
sources are needed to organize, direct, and mobilize contention. With-
out organizational capacity, individuals remain isolated from one an-
other and unable effectively to launch collective endeavours. Differ-
ences in mobilization patterns are, in part, explained by the degree of
resource availability, and the types of resources and mobilizing struc-
tures utilized by particular groups. For Islamic activism, important re-
sources and mobilizing structures in-
clude mosques, study circles, dense so-
cial networks (friends and family), Is-
lamic non-governmental organizations,
political parties, the dars (religious les-
son), the khutba (sermon), professional
and student associations, and unions.
All of these are utilized to effectively re-
cruit, organize, and launch contention.
To a large extent, the reason Islamic
movements have emerged as a domi-
nant opposition in the Muslim world is
because they command more societal
institutions and resources than other
movements. In addition, the ability of
activists to tap religious resources pro-
vides a modicum of protection from
regime repression. Certainly, regimes in
the Muslim world have severely ham-
strung mobilization, but a full-blown
crackdown on religious institutions and
resources is a delicate and difficult en-
deavour, since it can engender societal
backlashes.
Examples of resource mobilization
abound. In the early 1990s, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) utilized the na-
tional network of mosques and com-
munity organizations in Algeria to or-
ganize for elections. The electoral suc-
cess of the FIS in the face of regime re-
pression and electoral manipulation
was, at least in part, due to the party’s
access to enduring religious institu-
tions. The Islamic Group (al-Jama‘a al-
Islamiyya) in Egypt enjoyed similar resources and institutional access
during the 1980s. In the city of Dairut (Upper Egypt) alone, the move-
ment controlled about 150 mosques. Access to the mosques was used
to provide social welfare services, create community “reconciliation
committees,” hold meetings, and recruit support. The regime’s difficul-
ty in uprooting the Islamic Group in the 1990s reflected the organiza-
tional resilience of the movement. When the regime tried to repress
the movement, it met dramatic resistance since “after a decade of or-
ganizing social and political networks in Upper Egypt, the Islamists had
the capacity to fight back.”2 Moderate Islamic groups in Egypt, Jordan,
and Yemen have successfully utilized grassroots networks of non-gov-
ernmental organizations to provide basic goods and services to com-
munities, develop contact points with the public, recruit support, and
organize. 
Resource mobilization is a process that transcends the specificity of
ideology. Though ideology can limit the range of resource options by
excluding some as contrary to movement beliefs, movement fortunes
frequently ebb and flow according to resource availability and institu-
tional access. A focus on resource mobilization emphasizes how move-
ments mobilize, rather than the ultimate goal of mobilization. 
Decision making
Some earlier research on Islamic activism assumed the pre-eminence
of belief in dictating behaviour. Although this assumption was never a
universal norm, Orientalist influence often privileged the causal import
of ideas and Islam as a belief system.
Largely, the new emphasis on process challenges some earlier onto-
logical assertions about the Islamic ac-
tivist. Rather than viewing activists as
dogmatically guided by rigid adher-
ence to ideology, a number of recent
studies adopt a loose rational actor
model. From this perspective, Islamic
activists are driven by tactical and
strategic assessments of costs and
risks. Choices reflect conscious evalua-
tions of whether decisions help
achieve goals within a context of op-
portunities and constraints. Although
such an approach tends to avoid the
conceptual language of rational choice
theory (preferences, utility maximiza-
tion, etc.), it shares the emphasis on
strategic decision-making.
Political Participation & Activism
For decades, the study of Islamic activism has
languished at the margins of social science
theory. With the exception of a small handful
of scholars (particularly those focused on the
Iranian revolution), research on Islamic
activism has not fully engaged the broader
theoretical and conceptual developments that
have emerged from scholarship on social
movements, revolutions, and contentious
politics. Yet this large body of comparative
research on non-Islamic forms of collective
action provides myriad tools of analysis and
theoretical leverage for many questions that
interest students of Islamic activism, including
issues of recruitment, tactics and strategies,




…in the new approach to Islamic
activism ...the emphasis is on
the process of constructing
discourse and the resulting
ideational packages.
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Political Participation & Activism
This trend is most apparent in studies
of violent groups in particular. Perhaps
as a reaction against caricatures of the
“irrational zealot,” social scientists
have highlighted the strategic logic of
radicals. Hamas, for example, strategi-
cally responds to changes in the politi-
cal context.3 Prior to the al-Aqsa intifa-
da in 2000, growing popularity for the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process chal-
lenged the viability of Hamas. Strict in-
transigence toward peace was likely to
erode support from a population that
sought an end to the economic and so-
cial hardships of occupation, thereby
threatening the organizational survival
of the movement. In response, Hamas
tactically adjusted its doctrine to ac-
commodate the possibility of peace by
framing it as a temporary pause in the
jihad. After the al-Aqsa intifada in
2000, however, popular support for
Hamas grew and the movement re-
turned to its earlier pro-violence
frames. Mohammed M. Hafez uses an implicit rational actor model to
explain Muslim rebellions in Algeria and Egypt during the 1990s. He
contends that violence erupted as a response to “an ill-fated combina-
tion of institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and on the other, reac-
tive and indiscriminate repression that threaten[ed] the organizational
resources and personal lives of Islamists.”4 To defend themselves
against regime repression the Islamists went underground and formed
exclusive organizations, leading to a process of encapsulation and rad-
icalization. Stathis N. Kavylas views the Islamist-led massacres that
plagued Algeria in the 1990s as strategic assaults intended to deter
civilian defections “in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture
characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule over the civilian
population, (b) mass civilian defections toward incumbents and (c) es-
calation of violence.”5 Several scholars have argued that the tactic of
suicide bombing is rational in that it helps Islamic (and other) terrorist
groups achieve their group goals.6 In addition, Michael Doran concep-
tualizes al-Qaeda as a rational actor, arguing that, “When it comes to
matters related to politics and war, al-Qaeda manoeuvres around its
dogmas with alacrity.” In this understanding, “Al-Qaeda’s long-term
goals are set by its fervent devotion to a radical religious ideology, but
in its short-term behaviour, it is a rational political actor operating ac-
cording to the dictates of realpolitik.”7
This is not to completely marginalize the role of Islamist ideology in
decision-making. The universe of potential choices is circumscribed by
the “imaginable options” within particular worldviews. However, the
rationality of Islamist decision-making demonstrates that the process
of choice is shared by a wide range of movement types.
Framing
Although the new approach to Islamic activism de-emphasizes ideol-
ogy and belief as causal variables, it does not reject the role of ideas al-
together. Instead, the primary concern is how ideas are socially creat-
ed, arranged, and disseminated. In other words, the emphasis is on the
process of constructing discourse and the resulting ideational pack-
ages. In the parlance of social movement theory, movements must
“frame” their arguments to persuade audiences and elicit support and
participation.
Al-Qaeda, for example, is embroiled in a bitter “frame dispute” with
the Saudi ulama (religious scholars) in which each asserts a particular
interpretation and the right to sacred authority. Al-Qaeda emphasizes
the knowledge, character, and logic of its scholars while attacking its
detractors based upon the same criteria. Its supporters are framed as
honourable, independent, and scientific in their approach to interpret-
ing Islam. Opponents, in contrast, are framed as corrupt “sheikhs of au-
thority” or “palace lackeys” inextricably linked to corrupt Muslim gov-
ernments. The framing strategy is designed to insert al-Qaeda as the
sole mediator between the sacred texts and religious practice. 
To maximize access to these discontented populations, Islamists
have in many cases generated frames that meld religious and non-reli-
gious themes to garner broad support
among those who are merely seeking a
change from the status quo rather than
an Islamic transformation. Meriem
Vergès, for example, shows how the Is-
lamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria
strategically framed itself as the heir to
the revolutionary mantel of the war of
independence.8 Using the language
and symbols of the revolution, the FIS
attempted to portray itself as a natural
extension of the struggle while de-
nouncing the regime as a usurper of
Algeria’s historic memory. Such exam-
ples demonstrate the strategic dimen-
sions of framing: content is frequently
selected according to its potential per-
suasive effects rather than solely on
the basis of ideology. 
An approach to the study of Islamic
activism that draws from social science
theory erodes essentialist assumptions
about Islamic exceptionalism. It offers
analytic tools for addressing key ques-
tions and draws from comparative research, thus adding broader em-
pirics. Moreover, by emphasizing the dynamics of activism rather than
the uniqueness of Islam as an organizing belief system, such an ap-
proach opens possibilities for dialogue with students of non-Islamic
contention, potentially offering new insights.
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…the reason Islamic
movements have emerged as
a dominant opposition in
the Muslim world is because




An earlier version of this article has been published in the IIAS Newsletter 33 (2004),
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